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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D. C. 20505

12 July 1978

Dear Edward,

25X1 [] was good enough to give me a copy of your article in the new Washington Review of Strategic and International Studies. I thoroughly enjoyed it. I thought your basic approach to the problem was both clever and intriguing. I wish we could get more of that kind of perspective brought to bear on the decision process.

The only area with which I have a question is your allegation on page 25 that a SALT agreement which has equality of numbers would "in substance" as well as in appearance be advantageous to the Soviets. Clearly, they would have the advantage of greater throw weight. For some time, at least, we would have the advantage of greater fractionization, greater accuracy and greater reliability. Perhaps you are assuming all of those factors are equal as Soviet technology moves forward. It seems to me it will be some time before they are equal across the board. In addition, it is a difficult calculation as to when we reach a crossover point at which our advantage in these three factors is clearly outweighed by their advantage in throw weight. Presumably, we can make a calculation as to how many targets of a given degree of hardness can be destroyed by either side's arsenal. That, however, is a quite theoretical calculation not taking account of the difference in target structures in the two countries, assuming perfect targeting and coordination, and assuming no interference from defenses or defensive actions. If one starts taking these other calculations into account, it becomes quite complex and many judgments must be introduced. I do not question that the appearance or perception may favor the Soviets largely because it is only we who complain in the public media about problems of inferiority; but on when an agreement on equal numbers would put the Soviets ahead, I am not as clear.

On this question of perceptions, I am very interested in exploring how we measure the "untaught perceptions of political leaders" which you mention. The genesis of those untaught perceptions must vary widely from the Prime Minister of Great Britain to the King of Saudi Arabia to the President of Malawi. How do we estimate what it is that shapes those perceptions at different levels of national sophistication? Is it not possible that a few millions of dollars spent shaping perceptions could do more good for us than tens of billions of dollars in weapon systems?

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I'm glad to hear you are also working on a new book featuring Attila the Hun. I hope maybe we'll have a chance to visit when you come back from your trip to the Far East. In the meantime, all the best.

Yours,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Stan", with a stylized flourish at the end.

STANSFIELD TURNER

Mr. Edward N. Luttwak
Associate Director
The Washington Center of
Foreign Policy Research
1740 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

12 JUL 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Administration
FROM: Director of Central Intelligence

I would like to ask you to look into ordering a new vehicle for my use, preferably an Oldsmobile size. I understand they have it in the diesel version now that complies with the environmental regulations.



Stan STANSFIELD TURNER

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